

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15860 01 OF 03 181725Z

43

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

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O 181619Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3603

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 15860

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: US, UR, PARM, OEXD

SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS-VERBATIM OF LIMITED MEETING OCT. 18

PNE MESSAGE NUMBER TWENTY-FIVE

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM OF PRIVATE MEETING OF OCTOBER
18 WITH STOESSEL, BUCHHEIM AND MUROMCEW ON THE U.S. SIDE
AND MOROKHOV, TIMERBAEV AND BRATCHIKOV ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

BEGIN TEXT: MOROKHOV: (OPENING THE MEETING) WE WILL
LISTEN WITH INTEREST TO ANYTHING YOU CAN TELL US REGARD-
ING YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING REPRESENTATIVES (OBSERVERS).

STOESSEL: WE DO NOT HAVE ANY VDETAILS THAT WE CAN PRESENT
TODAY; BUT THE MORE WE TALK ABOUT IT, THE MORE WE FEEL
THIS QUESTION DEPENDS ON THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY IN YOUR
PNE PROGRAM. WE WOULD LIKE TO LISTEN TO THE SOVIET SIDE
SINCE YOU HAVE AN ACTIVE ON-GOING PROGRAM, AND AS YOU
KNOW THE US HAS NO ACTIVE PROGRAM AND NO SPECIFIC PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE. IT IS THEREFORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO SPECIFY
WHAT THE RIGHTS AND ACTIVITIES OF OBSERVERS MIGHT BE
AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR MORE ABOUT SOVIET PLANS IN A
MORE SPECIFIC WAY. ALSO, WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR
VIEWS ABOUT VERIFICATION TO ENSURE THAT TESTS ARE FOR
PEACEFUL USES AND ARE NOT WEAPON-RELATED.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15860 01 OF 03 181725Z

MY DELEGATION HAS LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO DR.

MYASNIKOV'S PRESENTATION ON YOUR EXPERIMENTS WITH UNDERGROUND CAVITIES. THIS IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF A SPECIFIC EXPERIMENT; AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR MORE ABOUT OTHER EXPERIMENTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT KIND OF EXPERIMENT THAT MYASNIKOV MENTIONED HAD A LOW YIELD AND THERE WAS A CLEAR STATEMENT OF PURPOSE; AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVICE. FOR THIS KIND OF EXPERIMENT, WITH ADEQUATE ADVANCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE, NO OBSERVERS MIGHT BE NEEDED. WITH OTHER TYPES OF EXPERIMENTS FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES AND UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES OBSERVERS MIGHT BE NEEDED. THEN THERE IS THE QUESTION OF EXPLOSIONS ABOVE THE THRESHOLD THAT HAS TO BE CONSIDERED.

WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE WHOLE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES AND IT WILL BE USEFUL, IF POSSIBLE, IF YOU COULD GIVE US THE GROSS PARAMETERS OF YOUR PROJECTS, THE CATEGORIES, THE APPROXIMATE YIELDS, AND THE NUMBERS OF EXPLOSIONS. ALSO IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD TELL US HOW YOU COULD SATISFY US THAT THESE ARE PNEs AND NOT WEAPON-RELATED SHOTS.

EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC FUTURE PLANS, DR. FLEMING WAS ABLE TO TELL YOU IN SOME DETAIL WHAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IF WE DID PROCEED, NAMELY, THE PURPOSE, THE NUMBER OF SHOTS, YIELD, AND LOCALITY THAT WE WOULD USE. THIS IS THE SORT OF THING WE HAVE IN MIND WHEN WE ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR PROGRAMS BECAUSE, AFTER ALL, YOUR PROGRAM IS THE DOMINANT ONE AND NOT OURS. IF YOU GIVE US THE SPECIFICS THEN, ON THAT BASIS, WE CAN JUDGE WHAT THE OBSERVER REQUIREMENTS MIGHT BE. OUR INTEREST IS SLANTED TOWARDS THE PROBLEM OF VERIFYING THAT PNEs ARE NOT USED FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE US SIDE TO KNOW THAT PNEs WILL NOT BE WEAPON-RELATED AND THAT THIS CAN BE VERIFIED.

MOROKHOV: THANK YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR, FOR YOUR STATEMENT. WE ARE SORRY THAT AFTER TWO WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE HEARD SO LITTLE. I, PERSONALLY, AND MY COLLEAGUES FEEL THAT THE US POSITION IS, AS YET, NOT CLEAR. WE TRIED TO DISCUSS OUR PROGRAM, WE GAVE OUR APPROACH TO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15860 01 OF 03 181725Z

VERIFICATION, WE GAVE YOU A CONVINCING AND SUBSTANTIVE PRESENTATION OF THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE PURPOSE AND AMOUNT OF THE INFORMATION SUBJECT TO EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US.

I THINK THAT YOU IN THE US HAVE A VERY NARROW VIEW OF PNEs; YOU ONLY LOOK AT THE SITUATION TODAY AND TOMORROW AND PERHAPS A FEW YEARS HENCE. I AM CONVINCED

THAT YOU WILL CONDUCT PNES IN THE US AND IN THIRD COUNTRIES WITH US AND USSR ASSISTANCE. AS I MENTIONED BEFORE, YOU CANNOT STOP TECHNICAL PROGRESS, AND HISTORY SHOWS THAT SOMETIMES PEOPLE ARE SLOW IN ACCEPTING PROGRESS. MANY CITIZENS KNOW ABOUT RADIATION, BUT FEW COMPREHEND THE DANGERS OF CONVENTIONAL SOURCES OF ENERGY. PROGRESS OF PNES WILL DEPEND ON PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE IN THE US OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

I CANNOT AGREE THAT THE US HAS LITTLE PNE KNOWLEDGE AND LITTLE EXPERIENCE WITH PNES. YOUR COLLEAGUES WOULD NOT AGREE WITH THAT VIEW. YOU HAVE MUCH ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR PLOWSHARE PROGRAM AND ON THIS BASIS COULD JUDGE ALL ASPECTS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE EXPERIENCE IN AN INDUSTRIAL PNE PROGRAM FOR UNDERGROUND SHOTS FOR STORAGE CAVITIES; IN OTHERS WE ARE ONLY EXPERIMENTING; AND WE ARE ONLY REACHING THE US LEVEL OF THE PLOWSHARE EXPERIMENTS RIGHT NOW. IT IS NOT RIGHT TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS FAR ADVANCED AND THAT THE US HAS LITTLE EXPERIENCE WITH PNE. I CANNOT AGREE WITH THAT; AND IF YOU LET YOUR EXPERTS SPEAK "NOT ON INSTRUCTION" BUT SINCERELY THEY WILL AGREE WITH ME. AS FOR YOUR DESIRE TO HEAR MORE ABOUT THE SOVIET PNE PROGRAM, ABOUT YIELD AND TRENDS, I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT THE SOVIET APPROVED PROGRAM ENDS IN 1975. AS FOR OUR 5-YEAR PLAN STARTING IN 1975, THERE IS NOTHING CONCRETE THAT I CAN TELL YOU. I DON'T HAVE ANY MORE DETAILS.

WE ARE READY, IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, TO SHARE OUR EXPERIENCE IN PNES AND WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM THE US SOMETHING OF THE KIND OF PRESENTATION GIVEN BY MYASNIKOV.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 15860 01 OF 03 181725Z

AT LEAST TELL US ABOUT RIO BLANCE BECAUSE WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THAT EXPERIMENT. WE WILL BE READY TO PRESENT MORE TECHNICAL PAPERS NEXT WEEK. OUR EXPERTS ARE NOT HERE JUST TO TALK ABOUT THEIR OWN WORK, EVEN THOUGH THEY WOULD FIND THIS PLEASANT; THEY WOULD LIKE TO HEAR ABOUT US EXPERIENCE. WE HAVE UNLIMITED POSSIBILITIES FOR TECHNICAL TALKS BUT WE NEED RECIPROCITY. YESTERDAY DR. MYASNIKOV GAVE A VERY IMPORTANT PRESENTATION ON VERIFICATION, AND I ASKED YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR, THAT YOU HAVE US EXPERTS STUDY IT VERY CAREFULLY. BECAUSE, IF YOU KNOW OF THE PURPOSE AND THE ANNOUNCED YIELD OF THE NUCLEAR DEVICE, THEN YOU CANNOT MAKE ANY ERRORS IN THE YIELD ESTIMATE BY NATIONAL MEANS. THE RANGE OF MINUS 15 PERCENT TO 25 PERCENT IS MORE THAN ENOUGH FOR AN

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15860 02 OF 03 181736Z

41

ACTION SS-25

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O 181619Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3604

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 15860

EXDIS

ACCURATE ESTIMATE FOR VERIFICATION. AS WE MENTIONED BEFORE, IF YOU GO OUTSIDE THESE LIMITS, THERE ARE VARIOUS DANGERS SUCH AS SEISMICITY AND RADIATION, AND LOW ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. OF COURSE, WE ARE READY TO HAVE A BROAD EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON PNES, BUT WE HAVE TO HAVE A FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THAT. INFORMATION IS A VALUABLE RESOURCE, REPRESENTING AN INVESTMENT OF LABOR AND MATERIAL, AND EACH SIDE HAS TO PROVIDE SOMETHING OF EQUAL VALUE IN RETURN. I HAVE TO STATE THAT THIS DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE OF ARTICLE III OF TTBT, BUT WE STILL HAVE TO WORK OUT CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THIS ARTICLE. AFTER TWO WEEKS I AM STILL AT A LOSS WHAT TO REPORT TO THE HIGH-UP LEVELS OF MY GOVERNMENT. I ONLY KNOW MY OWN POSITION; I CANNOT REPORT ON THIS US POSITION. I CANNOT EVEN FORMULATE IT AND THIS PUTS ME IN AN AWKWARD POSITION. I HAVE TO FORMULATE YOUR POSITION ON OBSERVERS OR REPRESENTATIVES, WHICHEVER TERM WE ARE GOING TO USE. IN OUR TECHNICAL REPORTS WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT OBSERVERS ARE NOT NEEDED UNDER ARTICLE III; AND THAT ALL QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE COULD BE RESOLVED WITHOUT OBSERVERS. NO ONE WOULD SERIOUSLY BELIEVE THAT WEAPON TESTING CAN BE MASKED UNDER PNE PROGRAMS. I KNOW THIS; I CANNOT VIEW THIS ARGUMENT SERIOUSLY; PERHAPS ONLY SOME PHILISTINES COULD SPEAK THAT WAY. PERHAPS WE WILL HAVE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15860 02 OF 03 181736Z

SOME REFERENCE TO IT IN SOME DOCUMENTS TO SATISFY SOME PEOPLE WHO ARE CONCERNED.

WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THESE OBSERVERS WILL DO. I KNOW THAT DR. KISSINGER RAISED THIS QUESTION IN TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO (TIMERBAEV INTERVENED: KISSINGER RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF OBSERVERS WITH GROMYKO).

THE OBSERVER ISSUE WAS RAISED BY THE US BUT WE NEVER DID DEVELOP THIS CONCEPT. IT WOULD HELP US TO MOVE FORWARD IF WE ONLY KNOW WHAT THEY WOULD DO. IT IS YOUR IDEA TO HAVE OBSERVERS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE EXPLOSION WILL BE ABOVE THE THRESHOLD (MOROKHOV CORRECTED HIMSELF: EXPLOSIONS ABOVE SOME LEVELS).

I DO NOT KNOW WHAT I CAN REPORT TO MY HIGHER LEVELS, BECAUSE YOU HAVE NOT CLARIFIED YOUR POSITION. AS FOR ARTICLE III, IF YOU HAVE SUCH INFORMATION AS GIVEN BY MYASNIKOV, YOU DO NOT NEED AN OBSERVER. NAMELY, IF YOU KNOW THE PURPOSE, THE PLACE, THE YIELD, THE KIND AS WELL AS THE ACTUAL YIELD AND RESULTS AFTER THE BLAST THEN YOU KNOW SUFFICIENTLY WELL WHETHER THIS WAS A PNE OR A WEAPONS TEST. THAT IS ALL I HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THAT. I MUST ADD THAT WE ARE IN AN UNBALANCED SITUATION; WE ARE THE HOSTS; YOU ARE OUR GUESTS. WE TRY TO MAKE YOUR STAY USEFUL AND PLEASANT. WE SHOW YOU FILMS. IS THIS USEFUL? WE TRY TO MAKE YOUR STAY A PLEASANT ONE, AND THAT TASK IS EASIER. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT WE ARE DOING HERE.

STOESSEL: THANK YOU, MR. MINISTER FOR A VERY CLEAR STATEMENT OF YOUR VIEWS. THESE WERE VERY HELPFUL AND I WILL REPORT BACK HOME ON YOUR POSITION AND YOUR CONCERNS. I NOW WOULD LIKE TO RECIPROCATATE AND MAKE SOME COMMENTS.

IN THE BEGINNING, I NOTED THAT YOU DISCUSSED YOUR PNE PROGRAM AND YOUR APPROACH TO VERIFICATION. WE APPRECIATE IT BUT WE FEEL THAT THIS WAS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH FOR OUR SIDE. WE WOULD LIKE TO GET MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON YOUR PROGRAM AND WAYS FOR PNE VERIFICATION. WE FOUND DR. MYASNIKOV'S STATEMENT VERY USEFUL AND VERY SPECIFIC; BUT, AS I SAID BEFORE, THIS IS ONLY ONE KIND OF EXPERIMENT UNDER GIVEN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15860 02 OF 03 181736Z

CIRCUMSTANCES AND FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR ABOUT A WIDER RANGE OF YOUR PROGRAM SO THAT

WE CAN THEN DECIDE ON CONDITIONS AND SOME POINT IN AN OVERALL AGREEMENT.

AS FOR OUR OWN PROGRAM, WE HAVE HAD SOME PNE EXPERIENCES IN THE PST; BUT, AS FOR THE FUTURE, WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC PLANS AND RIGHT NOW WE ENVISION NO PNES FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, (TIMERBAEV SIGHING HEAVILY). OBVIOUSLY THE SOVIET UNION HAS AN ACTIVE AND ONGOING PROGRAM AND NOT THE US. YOU ASKED ME ABOUT THE RIO BLANCO EXPERIMENT AND YOU ALSO MENTIONED RECIPROCITY. I WILL ASK MY AUTHORITIES WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT A PRESENTATION. AS FOR THE USEFULNESS OF OUR TALKS, PERHAPS WE SHOULD HAVE SUCH TECHNICAL TALKS IN SMALLER GROUPS AND NOT THE PLENARY.

MOROKHOV: THE WAY THINGS ARE AT LEAST WE HAVE SOMETHING TO TALK ABOUT DURING PLENARY SESSIONS. IF WE BREAK UP INTO SMALL GROUPS, WHAT WILL WE DO AT THE PLENARIES? WE'LL BE IN A DIFFICULT POSITON.

STOESSEL: YOU MENTIONED YOUR DIFFICULTE IS ABOUT REPORTING TO YOUR AUTHORITIES. I WOULD NOW LIKE TO REVIEW OUR POSITION. AS WE STATED BEFORE, WE FEEL THAT THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS FLOW FROM ARTICLE III OF THE TTBT AND OUR EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TO THAT END. WE STRESS THE NEED FOR VERIFYING THAT PNES ARE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES ONLY AND ARE NOT WEAPON-RELATED. I STRESS THAT WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AND THAT WE HAVE TO SATISFY THESE CONCERNS IF THE TTBT IS GOING TO BE RATIFIED. ALSO, AS I MENTIONED BEFORE, ANY AGREEMENT ON PNES HAS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LTBT. AS YOU MENTIONED, THE QUESTION OF OBSERVERS WAS RAIDED BY MINISTER GROMYKO AND DR. KISSINGER. I RECALL THAT IN JUNE YOU MADE SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON OBSERVERS. SINCE YOUR SIDE HAS AN ACTIVE PNE PROGRAM IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GET YOUR VIEWS IN A MORE SPECIFIC FORM ON

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 15860 03 OF 03 181756Z

43

ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 15860

EXDIS

OBSERVERS. THIS WOULD GIVE US A BETTER IDEA OF THEIR
ROLE SO THAT WE CAN SATISFY OUR CONCERNS.

MR. MINISTER, YOU SPOKE OF TWO TYPES OF A POSSIBLE
AGREEMENT. ONE AS YOU SUGGESTED WOULD BE A BROADER
AGREEMENT INCLUDING COOPERATION ON PNES, IN CONTRAST
WITH A NARROWER ONE DEALING ONLY WITH ARTICLE III.
AT THIS TIME WE HAVE NO VIEWS WHETHER IT SHOULD BE A
BROAD OR A NARROW AGREEMENT IN THESE TERMS. WITH
REGARD TO ARTICLE V OF NPT, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE ITS
IMPORTANCE, WE ALSO HAVE NO VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE AT
THIS TIME. HOWEVER, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN YOUR
VIEWS ON HOW THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE HANDLED IN THE
NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR.

SO THIS IS OUR PRESENT POSITION AS I SEE IT. PERHAPS
WE WILL BE ABLE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ON SOME SUBSTANTIVE
POINTS LATER ON; BUT THIS IS OUR PRESENT POSITION.
I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU NOW FOR YOUR FINE HOSPITALITY
AND ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS AND I ASSURE YOU THAT WE ALSO
WANT TO GET SOME SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE QUICKLY.
MOROKHOV: THANK YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR. I WOULD ONLY LIKE
TO SAY A FEW WORDS ON REPRESENTATIVES OR OBSERVERS.
AS I REMEMBER IT, THIS PROPOSITION AROSE QUITE UNEX-
PECTEDLY AT THIS VERY TABLE IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE
III AND WAS PUT DOWN ON PAPER. (TIMERBAEV INTERJECTED:
WRITTEN DOWN BUT NOW IN ANY AGREEMENT). THEN, AS NOW,
I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT IT MEANS. OUR EXPERTS HAVE CLEARLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15860 03 OF 03 181756Z

DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR OBSERVERS FOR THE
PURPOSES OF ARTICLE III. YOU WILL NEED SOME REAL
GOOD HARD PROOF TO CONVINCE US THAT THEY ARE NEEDED. I
BELIEVE THAT IT WAS DR. KISSINGER WHO RAISED THE QUESTION
ON THE STATUS OF OBSERVERS IN CONNECTION WITH MR. GROMYKO;
THEREFORE, WE WANT US VIEWS ON FUNCTIONS OF OBSERVERS.
STOESSEL: WHEN WAS THAT?
TIMERBAEV: WHEN THEY MET ON ALEXEI TOLSTOI STREET.
MOROKHOV: NOW LET US LOOK AT ARTICLE V. AS I SEE IT,
WE CAN TAKE THE BROADER OR THE NARROWER VIEW. BY
BROADER, I MEAN HOW THE SOVIET UNION AND YOUR COUNTRY
COULD COOPERATE UNDER ARTICLE V ON A BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL BASIS. WE ARE READY TO TALK ABOUT IT VERY
SOON. BY NARROW, I MEAN THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SAFETY
STANDARDS. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS THAT, BUT I UNDER-

STAND THAT THE US SIDE IS NOT READY FOR IT. I UNDER-
STOOD DR. BUCHHEIM TO SAY YESTERDAY THAT THE US
DELEGATION IS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE BUT I
ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE READY. (MOROKNOV THEN ASKED
BRATCHIKOV TO READ A TASS REPORT FROM VIENNA THAT THE
IAEA WAS SENDING INVITATIONS TO LISTED COUNTRIES TO
PARTICIPATE IN A MEETING IN JANUARY 1975 ON PNE
EXCAVATION AND FORMING OF UNDERGROUND CAVITIES.)
OUR EXPERTS ARE TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR THAT CONFERENCE
AND THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF OUR MEETING OF EXPERTS. WE
NEED TO AGREE ON OUR COMMON POSITION, BUT I SEE THAT
THE US SIDE IS NOT READY YET SO WE WILL PATIENTLY WAIT.
NOW LET US LOOK AT OUR WORK SCHEDULE FOR NEXT WEEK.
STOESSEL: I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS ABOUT
OBSERVERS. AS YOU KNOW WE FEEL THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF
OBSERVERS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE
III; AND DR. DISSINGER HAS MADE SOME PUBLIC STATEMENTS
TO THAT EFFECT. I AM CONCERNED THAT SOVIET EXPERTS
NOW SAY THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR OBSERVERS, ON THE
BASIS OF THEIR RESEARCH. I WANT TO STRESS THE
IMPORTANCE - THE PRINCIPLE - OF THE OBSERVER QUESTION.
NOT TO ACCEPT OBSERVERS WOULD UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO
REACH A SATISFACTORY PNE AGREEMENT AS STATED IN ARTICLE
III.
BOTH SIDES AGREED TO HAVE A PLENARY SESSION MONDAY
AFTERNOON, OCT 21. ALSO TO MEET TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY).
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 15860 03 OF 03 181756Z

MOROKHOV: (INTERJECTION BY MOROKHOV DURING TRANSLATION
OF STOESSEL'S REMARKS INTO RUSSIAN). I WOULD PUT IT
SO: IF THIS PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN ACCEPTED IT WOULD HAVE
BEEN WRITTEN DOWN, AND OUR TASK WOULD BE EASIER.)
MOROKHOV: ABOUT OBSERVERS, AS I SAID BEFORE, WHAT
WILL BE THEIR FUNCTION? IF OBSERVERS ARE SO IMPORTANT
TO YOU, SHOW ME, FIRST OF ALL, THE NEED FOR OBSERVERS
AND GIVE US A GOOD CONVINCING REASON FOR IT. THIS
WILL INDICATE TO US THEIR FUNCTIONS; AND, SECONDLY, AS
I HAVE STRESSED BEFORE, IT WILL BE MUCH EASIER TO COME
TO AN UNDERSTANDING ON IT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A
BROADER AGREEMENT.
STOESSEL: WHEN WE MEET ON MONDAY PERHAPS WE COULD
HAVE A GENERAL REVIEW OF OUR DISCUSSION TO SEE WHERE
WE STAND.
MOROKHOV: NO OBJECT, BUT WE HAVE ALREADY DONE IT
AND NOT GOTTEN VERY FAR. PERHAPS WE WILL TALK ABOUT
TECHNOLOGY. EACH SIDE COULD PRESENT A PAPER. WE WILL
SHOW YOU A FILM ON CRUSHING OF HARD ROCK ORE DEPOSITS
AND THEN PERHAPS MR. RADINOV WILL PRESENT A PAPER ON
THE RESIDUAL STRESS IN HARD ROCKS AFTER AN EXPLOSION.
STOESSEL: DR. ROMNEY CAN ALSO MAKE A SECOND STATEMENT.

I WILL ALSO SEE WHAT WE CAN TELL YOU ABOUT RIO BLANCO.
MOROKHOV: TELL US ABOUT ANY OF YOUR EXPERIMENTS, BUT
IN MORE DETAIL THAN BEFORE. SO FAR WE HAD SOME SORT
OF A FREE-FOR-ALL IN OUR COOPERATION, PERHAPS WE OUGHT
TO PUT IT INTO SOME SORT OF A FRAMEWORK. (AMB.
STOESSEL MENTIONED BEFORE ADJOURNING THAT DR. BUCHHEIM
COULD CHAIR THE MEETINGS IF NECESSARY DURING THE
SECOND HALF OF NEXT WEEK, WHEN DR. KISSINGER WILL BE
IN MOSCOW.)
IN A SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN MOROKHOV AND
STOESSEL, MOROKHOV STRESSED THE DIFFICULTY OF
HANDLING OBSERVERS IN A "NARROW" AGREEMENT, BECAUSE
OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS AN ACTIVE PNE
PROGRAM AND THE US DOES NOT. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT
ALL OBSERVER ACTIVITY WOULD BE ON SOVIET SOIL, WHICH
WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE
CONCLUDED A BROAD COOPERATION AGREEMENT, THIS
PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED, SINCE WE WOULD BE DOING
JOINT WORK TOGETHER, AND THERE WOULD BE LESS DIFFICULTY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 15860 03 OF 03 181756Z

ABOUT OBSERVERS, EVEN IF THE BULK OF EXPLOSIONS
WERE IN THE USSR. MOROKHOV INDICATED THAT HE HAD A
DRAFT "BROAD" AGREEMENT READY WHICH HE HAD WORKED OUT
ON A "PERSONAL" BASIS.
STOESSEL

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